Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks

Xiang Sun, Jin Xu and Junjie Zhou

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 978-991

Abstract: In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the aggregate actions and equilibrium payoffs under two regimes are the same. We also show that, in some sense, the Tullock form is necessary for such a neutrality result. Moving beyond the Tullock family, we further demonstrate how the curvature of contest technology shapes the welfare and effort effects.

Keywords: Conflict network; Neutrality; Curvature of contest technology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Working Paper: Effort Discrimination and Curvature of Contest Technology in Conflict Networks (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:978-991

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.10.013

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