Effort Discrimination and Curvature of Contest Technology in Conflict Networks

Xiang Sun, Jin Xu and Junjie Zhou

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Abstract: In a model of interconnected conflicts on a network, we compare the equilibrium effort profiles and payoffs under two scenarios: uniform effort (UE) in which each contestant is restricted to exert the same effort across all the battles she participates, and discriminatory effort (DE) in which such a restriction is lifted. When the contest technology in each battle is of Tullock form, a surprising neutrality result holds within the class of semi-symmetric conflict network structures: both the aggregate actions and equilibrium payoffs under two regimes are the same. We also show that, in some sense, the Tullock form is necessary for such a neutrality result. Moving beyond the Tullock family, we further demonstrate how the curvature of contest technology shapes the welfare and effort effects.

Date: 2023-02, Revised 2023-10
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Journal Article: Effort discrimination and curvature of contest technology in conflict networks (2023)
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