Robust equilibria in tournaments

Lining Han, Ruben Juarez and Miguel Vargas

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 142, issue C, 423-439

Abstract: We study robust equilibria in tournaments, where agents endowed with power form coalitions, and the coalition formed with the highest power prevails. We introduce the No-Threat Equilibrium (NTE), a stable partition where if a coalition deviates, then a new coalition could counter by forming an even stronger coalition. The NTE exists for any power function and preferences if and only if the set of feasible coalitions is a ‘Helly’ family.

Keywords: Coalition formation; Robust equilibria; Tournament; Externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:142:y:2023:i:c:p:423-439

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.012

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