Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments

Tobias Cagala, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke and Simeon Schudy

Games and Economic Behavior, 2024, vol. 143, issue C, 179-190

Abstract: Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Keywords: Cheating; Lying; Truth-telling; Compliance; Commitment; No-cheating rule; No-cheating declaration; Commitment request (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:143:y:2024:i:c:p:179-190

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.014

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