Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments

Tobias Cagala, Ulrich Glogowsky, Johannes Rincke and Simeon Schudy
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Tobias Cagala: Deutsche Bundesbank
Johannes Rincke: University of Erlangen-Nuremberg

No 466, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Keywords: cheating; lying; truth-telling; compliance; commitment; no-cheating rule; no-cheating declaration; commitment request (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C93 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Related works:
Journal Article: Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:466

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