Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium

Ludovic Renou and Karl Schlag

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 527-533

Abstract: This Note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of [epsilon]-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in [epsilon]-minimax regret equilibrium for all [epsilon][set membership, variant][0,1).

Keywords: Implementation; Minimax; regret; Maskin; monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:527-533

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