Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium

Ludovic Renou and Karl Schlag

No 09/24, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: This note studies the problem of implementing social choice correspondences in environments where individuals have doubts about the rationality of their opponents. We postulate the concept of "-minimax regret as our solution concept and show that social choice correspondences that are Maskin monotonic and satisfy the no-veto power condition are implementable in "-minimax regret equilibrium for all " ? [0, 1).

Keywords: Implementation; minimax regret; Maskin monotonicity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium (2011)
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