Two equivalence results for two-person strict games

Pingzhong Tang and Fangzhen Lin

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 2, 479-486

Abstract: A game is strict if for both players, different profiles have different payoffs. Two games are best response equivalent if their best response functions are the same. We prove that a two-person strict game has at most one pure Nash equilibrium if and only if it is best response equivalent to a strictly competitive game, and that it is best response equivalent to an ordinal potential game if and only if it is best response equivalent to a quasi-supermodular game.

Keywords: Strictly; competitive; games; Ordinal; potential; games; Quasi-supermodular; games; Best; response; equivalence; Strict; games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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