Imitation games and computation

Andrew McLennan () and Rabee Tourky

Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, issue 1, 4-11

Abstract: An imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. We explain how, in two different settings, observations obtained from imitation games complete a circle of ideas, showing that phenomena that had for many years seemed to be distinct are actually superficially different manifestations of a single structure. First, one can pass from a given two person finite game to an imitation game whose Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. Second, each of the paths of the procedure described in Lemke (1965) for solving a linear complementarity problem is the projection of the path of the Lemke-Howson algorithm applied to an imitation game.

Keywords: Computational; economics; Symmetric; games; Nash; equilibrium; Computational; complexity; Two; person; games; 2-Nash; Imitation; games; Lemke-Howson; algorithm; Lemke; paths (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899-8256(09)00163-8
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Imitation Games and Computation (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:4-11

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().