Folk theorems with bounded recall under (almost) perfect monitoring

George Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 1, 174-192

Abstract: We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium when the monitoring is perturbed from perfect to highly-correlated private.

Keywords: Repeated; games; Bounded; recall; strategies; Folk; theorem; Imperfect; monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring (2008)
Working Paper: Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:174-192

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