Bargaining with a property rights owner
Yair Tauman () and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2010, vol. 70, issue 1, 132-145
We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. In a solution every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are the same across all agents and all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaining surplus. The symmetric solution is the nucleolus of a naturally related coalitional game.
Keywords: Cooperative; solution; Nucleolus; Patent; licensing; Intellectual; property (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: Bargaining with a Property Rights Owner (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:1:p:132-145
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Series data maintained by Dana Niculescu ().