Bargaining with a Property Rights Owner
Yair Tauman () and
No 1, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics
We consider a bargaining problem where one of the players, the intellectual property rights owner (IPRO) can allocate licenses for the use of this property among the interested parties (agents). The agents negotiate with him the allocation of licenses and the payments of the licensees to the IPRO. We state five axioms and characterize the bargaining solutions which satisfy these axioms. Every solution is characterized by a fraction a. Every agent obtains a weighted average of his individually rational level and his marginal contribution to the set of all players, where the weights are a and 1-a, respectively, uniformly over all bargaining problems. The IPRO obtains the remaing surplus. The solution for a=1/2 is the nucleolus of a naturally related game in characteristic form.
Keywords: Bargaining solution; nucleolus; licensing; property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: Forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior
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Journal Article: Bargaining with a property rights owner (2010)
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