A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments

Armin Schmutzler

Games and Economic Behavior, 2011, vol. 71, issue 1, 212-223

Abstract: The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.

Keywords: Comparative; statics; Supermodularity; Strategic; complementarity; Quantal-response; equilibrium; Level-k; reasoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: A unified approach to comparative statics puzzles in experiments (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:212-223

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