Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux and Richard Holden

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 83, issue C, 284-290

Abstract: We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

Keywords: Behavioral mechanism design; Implementation; Lying costs; Separable domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (82)

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Working Paper: Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (2014)
Working Paper: Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:83:y:2014:i:c:p:284-290

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011

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