Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty

Navin Kartik, Olivier Tercieux and Richard Holden

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Abstract: We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.

Keywords: Behavioral mechanism design; Implementation; Lying costs; Separable domain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 83, pp.284-290. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00943301

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011

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