The effect of environmental uncertainty on the tragedy of the commons

Sam Aflaki

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 240-253

Abstract: We model a common pool resource game under environmental uncertainty, where individuals in a symmetric group face the dilemma of sharing a common resource. Each player chooses a consumption level and obtains a corresponding share of that resource, but if total consumption exceeds a sustainable level then the resource deteriorates and all players are worse-off. We consider the effect of uncertainty about the sustainable resource size on the outcome of this game. Assuming a general dynamic for resource deterioration, we study the effect of increased ambiguity (i.e., uncertain probabilities pertaining to the common resourceʼs sustainable size). We show that whereas increased risk may lead to more selfish behavior (i.e., to more consumption), increased ambiguity may have the opposite effect.

Keywords: CPR games; Environmental uncertainty; Risk and ambiguity; The tragedy of the commons (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D60 D71 D80 Q01 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:240-253

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.011

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