Strategic information exchange

Dinah Rosenberg, Eilon Solan () and Nicolas Vieille ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 444-467

Abstract: We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In our model, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided oneʼs initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

Keywords: Repeated games; Incomplete information on both sides; Information externalities; Folk Theorem; Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Strategic Information Exchange (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:444-467

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.010

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