Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources

Daniele Condorelli

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 82, issue C, 582-591

Abstract: A number of identical objects is allocated to a set of privately informed agents. Agents have linear utility in money. The designer wants to assign objects to agents that possess specific traits, but the allocation can only be conditioned on the willingness to pay and on observable characteristics. I solve for the optimal mechanism. The choice between market or non-market mechanisms depends on the statistical linkage between characteristics valued by the designer and willingness to pay.

Keywords: Non-market mechanisms; Rationing; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:82:y:2013:i:c:p:582-591

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008

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