Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Daniel Gottlieb ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 85, issue C, 127-158

Abstract: This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

Keywords: Memory; Self deception; Behavioral economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:85:y:2014:i:c:p:127-158

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013

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