Comparative statics of altruism and spite

Igal Milchtaich

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 809-831

Abstract: The equilibrium outcome of a strategic interaction may depend on the weight players place on other playersʼ payoffs or, more generally, on some social payoff that depends on everyoneʼs actions. A positive, negative or zero weight represents altruism, spite or complete selfishness, respectively. As it turns out, even in a symmetric interaction the equilibrium level of social payoff may be lower for a group of altruists than for selfish or spiteful groups. In particular, a concern for othersʼ payoffs may paradoxically lower these payoffs. However, this can only be so if the equilibrium strategies involved are unstable. If they are stable, the social payoff can only increase or remain unchanged with an increasing degree of altruism. In these results, ‘stability’ stands for a general notion of static stability, which includes a number of established ones, such as evolutionarily stable strategy, as special cases.

Keywords: Altruism; Selfishness; Comparative statics; Strategic games; Static stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:809-831

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.015

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