Communication and efficiency in auctions

Nenad Kos

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 1, 233-249

Abstract: We study auctions under restricted communication. Agents have valuations distributed over an interval but can only report one of a finite number of messages. We provide necessary conditions for welfare as well as revenue maximizing auctions in the independent private values case when bidders report simultaneously. We also show that the seller who chooses how to allocate a fixed number of messages allocates them evenly over all agents.

Keywords: Mechanism design; Message space; Communication complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:233-249

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.002

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