Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 1, 413-423

Abstract: We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidlerʼs (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Keywords: Pareto efficiency; Egalitarian equivalence; Asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2015)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2010)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:1:p:413-423

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.005

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