Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information

Geoffroy de Clippel, David Perez-Castrillo and David Wettstein ()

No 2010-5, Working Papers from Brown University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidlerís (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Keywords: Pareto Efficiency: Egalitarian Equivalence; Asymmetric Information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2015)
Journal Article: Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information (2012)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2010)
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