Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information

David Wettstein (), Geoffroy de Clippel and David Pérez-Castrillo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 431, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Keywords: asymmetric Information; Pareto Efficiency; Egalitarian Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information (2012)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2010)
Working Paper: Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:431

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