Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale

Bernard Lebrun ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 75, issue 2, 731-751

Abstract: In the presence of resale and under more general assumptions than Zhengʼs (2002), implementation of Myersonʼs (1981) optimal allocation with two bidders is achieved through the second-price auction. In a special class of asymmetric n-bidder models, it is achieved through the English auction.

Keywords: Optimality; Resale; Second-price auction; English auction; Heterogeneous bidders; Efficiency; Behavioral bidding strategies; No-regret property; Multiplicity of equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:75:y:2012:i:2:p:731-751

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.03.007

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