Lone wolves just got lonelier

Esteban Peralta

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 152, issue C, 55-61

Abstract: This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Lone wolf theorem; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:152:y:2025:i:c:p:55-61

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.03.010

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