Credibility of group manipulation in random assignments

Homa Hosseinzadeh Ranjbar and Mehdi Feizi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 150, issue C, 27-33

Abstract: For the random assignment problem, we introduce the notion of collusion-proofness that happens if the rule is immune to any collusion on misreporting preferences as it is either not profitable to form or profitable to betray. We characterize collusion-proofnessand prove that an assignment rule is collusion-proof if and only if it is strategy-proof and non-bossy. Therefore, the random serial dictatorship rule is immune to any collusive agreement between agents on preference misrepresentation, though it is not (weakly) group strategy-proof. This result gives us a possibility between collusion-proofness, ex-post Pareto efficiency, and equal treatment of equals. Furthermore, we proved that a large family of strategy-proof mechanisms called rank exchange mechanisms, à la Shende and Purohit (2023), are collusion-proof but group manipulable.

Keywords: Random assignment problem; Group strategy-proofness; Group manipulation; Collusion-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:27-33

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.016

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