On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

Shurojit Chatterji, Jordi Massó and Shigehiro Serizawa

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 150, issue C, 48-70

Abstract: We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Multi-dimensional single-peakedness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:48-70

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017

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