A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices

Yuya Wakabayashi, Ryosuke Sakai and Shigehiro Serizawa

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 150, issue C, 1-26

Abstract: We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.

Keywords: Multi-object allocation problem; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Minimum price Walrasian rule; Non-quasi-linear preference; Heterogeneous objects; Reserve prices (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 D63 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:150:y:2025:i:c:p:1-26

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011

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