Multi-item Vickrey–English–Dutch auctions
Tommy Andersson and
Albin Erlanson ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 116-129
Abstract:
Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multi-item auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey–English–Dutch auction and it contains the Vickrey–English auction [Sankaran, J.K., 1994. On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem. Math. Soc. Sci. 28, 143–150] and the Vickrey–Dutch auction [Mishra, D., Parkes, D., 2009. Multi-item Vickrey–Dutch auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 66, 326–347] as special cases. By means of numerical experiments, it is showed that when the auctioneer knows the biddersʼ value distributions, the Vickrey–English–Dutch auction is weakly faster than the Vickrey–English auction and the Vickrey–Dutch auction in 89 percent and 99 percent, respectively, of the investigated problems. A greedy version of the Vickrey–English–Dutch auction is demonstrated to perform even better in the simulation studies.
Keywords: Polynomial time algorithms; Multi-item auctions; Unit-demand bidders; Iterations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)
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Working Paper: Multi-Item Vickery-English-Dutch Auctions (2013) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:116-129
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.001
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