Aggregate comparative statics
Daron Acemoglu and
Martin Jensen ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 27-49
In aggregative games, each playerʼs payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. This paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of games: (1) aggregative games with strategic substitutes and (2) nice aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. The results are illustrated with applications to public good provision, contests, Cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly.
Keywords: Aggregative games; Strategic substitutes; Nice games; Comparative statics; Contests; Patent races; Public good provision; Cournot model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C60 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Aggregate Comparative Statics (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:27-49
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