Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 179-191

Abstract: In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Information structure; Correlated equilibrium; Garbling; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:179-191

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005

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