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Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence

Ehud Lehrer (), Dinah Rosenberg and Eran Shmaya
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Ehud Lehrer: TAU - School of Mathematical Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Raymond and Beverly Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences [Tel Aviv] - TAU - Tel Aviv University
Eran Shmaya: Kellogg [Northwestern] - Kellogg School of Management [Northwestern University, Evanston] - Northwestern University [Evanston]

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Abstract: In a game with incomplete information players receive stochastic signals about the state of nature. The distribution of the signals given the state of nature is determined by the information structure. Different information structures may induce different equilibria. Two information structures are equivalent from the perspective of a modeler, if they induce the same equilibrium outcomes. We characterize the situations in which two information structures are equivalent in terms of natural transformations, called garblings, from one structure to another. We study the notion of 'being equivalent to' in relation with three equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium, agent normal-form correlated equilibrium and the belief invariant Bayesian solution.

Keywords: Incomplete information; Information structure; Correlated equilibrium; Garbling; Robustness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, 81, pp.179-191. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01069192

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.005

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