A detail-free mediator
Péter Vida () and
Helmuts Azacis ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 81, issue C, 101-115
We present a cheap talk extension to any two-player, finite, complete information game, and ask what correlations over actions are implementable in Nash equilibria of the extended game. In the extension, players communicate repeatedly through a detail-free mediator that has been studied in Lehrer (1991) and in Gossner and Vieille (2001). The extension captures situations in which people can observe the opponentʼs face during the conversation. While Gossner and Vieille (2001) prove that no correlation can be securely implemented by using only this mediator, we prove a result closer to Lehrer (1991), namely, that the Nash equilibrium payoffs of the extended game essentially coincide with the correlated equilibrium payoffs of the underlying game. The contrasting results can be explained with our additional assumptions that the players can also communicate directly and, more importantly, the private messages sent to the mediator can be recorded and revealed later in the conversation.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Detail-free mechanism; Mediated pre-play communication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: A Detail-Free Mediator (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:81:y:2013:i:c:p:101-115
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