A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment

Francoise Forges

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 78, issue C, 64-71

Abstract: The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional commitments at the interim stage of a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium payoffs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.

Keywords: Bayesian game; Commitment; Contract; Incentive compatibility; Interim individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001868
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:78:y:2013:i:c:p:64-71

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.004

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().