Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection

Gabriel E. Kreindler and H. Young

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 80, issue C, 39-67

Abstract: Stochastic best response models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level is arbitrarily small. The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically stable equilibrium. An important exception arises when players interact locally in small close-knit groups; in this case convergence can be rapid for small noise and an arbitrarily large population. We show that a similar result holds when the population is fully mixed and there is no local interaction. Moreover, the expected waiting times are comparable to those in local interaction models.

JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (41)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Fast Convergence in Evolutionary Equilibrium Selection (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:80:y:2013:i:c:p:39-67

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.004

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