Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions

Nejat Anbarci () and Ching-jen Sun

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 77, issue 1, 367-376

Abstract: Most real-life bargaining is resolved gradually. During this process parties reach intermediate agreements. These intermediate agreements serve as disagreement points in subsequent rounds. We identify robustness criteria which are satisfied by three prominent bargaining solutions, the Nash, Proportional (and as a special case to the Egalitarian solution) and Discrete Raiffa solutions. We show that the “robustness of intermediate agreements” plus additional well-known and plausible axioms, provide novel axiomatizations of the above-mentioned solutions. Hence, we provide a unified framework for comparing these solutionsʼ bargaining theories.

Keywords: Nashʼs bargaining problem; Robustness; Intermediate agreements; The Discrete Raiffa solution; The Nash solution; Proportional solutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:367-376

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.001

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