A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting

Bo Chen () and Satoru Takahashi

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 571-581

Abstract: We introduce a “dynamic non-equivalent utilities” (DNEU) condition and the notion of dynamic player-specific punishments for a general repeated game with unequal discounting, both naturally generalizing the stationary counterparts in Abreu et al. (1994). We show that if the DNEU condition, i.e., no pair of players have equivalent utility functions in the repeated game, is satisfied, then any feasible and strictly sequentially individually rational payoff sequence allows dynamic player-specific punishments. Using this result, we prove a folk theorem for unequal discounting repeated games that satisfy the DNEU condition.

Keywords: Intertemporal trade; Folk theorem; Repeated game; Unequal discounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612001170
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:571-581

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.011

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().