Coordination need not be a problem

Prajit K. Dutta

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 519-534

Abstract: In a game of common interest there is one action vector that all players prefer to every other. Yet there may be multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in the game and the “coordination problem” refers to the fact that rational equilibrium play cannot rule out Pareto-dominated equilibria. In this paper, I prove that two elements — asynchronicity and a finite horizon — are sufficient to uniquely select the Pareto-dominant action vector (in subgame perfect equilibrium play). Asynchronicity may be exogenously specified by the rules of the game. Alternatively, in a game where players choose when to move, asynchronicity may emerge as an equilibrium move outcome.

Keywords: Coordination; Asynchronous moves; Finite horizon (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000966
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:519-534

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.07.002

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().