Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Ernesto Reuben and Arno Riedl

Games and Economic Behavior, 2013, vol. 77, issue 1, 122-137

Abstract: We investigate the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. With survey data we demonstrate that uninvolved individuals hold well defined yet conflicting normative views of fair contribution rules related to efficiency, equality, and equity. In the experiment, in the absence of punishment no positive contribution norm is observed and all groups converge towards free-riding. With punishment, strong and stable differences in contributions emerge across group types and individuals in different roles. In some cases these differences result from the emergence of an efficiency norm where all fully contribute. In the cases where full efficiency is not attained, these differences result from the enforcement of different relative contribution norms. Hence, our experimental data show that, even in heterogeneous groups, individuals can overcome the collective action problem inherent in public good games by agreeing on and enforcing a contribution norm.

Keywords: Public good; Heterogeneous groups; Punishment; Cooperation; Social norms; Norm enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D63 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (186)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations (2009)
Working Paper: Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations (2009)
Working Paper: Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:77:y:2013:i:1:p:122-137

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.001

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