Political competition between differentiated candidates

Stefan Krasa and Mattias K Polborn

Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 1, 249-271

Abstract: We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences and choose policy positions to maximize their winning probability.

Keywords: Multidimensional policy; Voting; Political competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Competition between Differentiated Candidates (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:1:p:249-271

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.003

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