Consistency of the Harsanyi NTU configuration value
E. Romero and
José Zarzuelo ()
Games and Economic Behavior, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 665-677
It is shown that the Harsanyi NTU solution is consistent according to the Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game for NTU games, when we consider payoff configurations as solution outcomes. Moreover, we characterize this solution on a wide class of NTU games where this solution is single-valued: namely, the games for which the feasible set of the grand coalition is given by a half-space. The axiom system includes efficiency, covariance, symmetry, a null-player axiom, consistency, and an additional axiom requiring coherence in the payoffs of the intermediate coalitions.
Keywords: Consistency; NTU games; Harsanyi value; Shapley value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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