A note on non-essential players in multi-choice cooperative games

Chih-Ru Hsiao ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 2, 424-432

Abstract: The Shapley value for a multi-choice cooperative game is transferable utility invariant and independent of non-essential players. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D46, D61, D72.

Date: 1995
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