Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

Alvin Roth and Ido Erev

Games and Economic Behavior, 1995, vol. 8, issue 1, 164-212

Abstract: We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does observed behavior approach the perfect equilibrium as players gain experience. We examine a family of learning models which possess some of the robust properties of learning noted in the psychology literature. The intermediate term predictions of these models track well the observed behavior in all three games, even though the models considered differ in their very long term predictions. We argue that for predicting observed behavior the intermediate term predictions of dynamic learning models may be even more important than their asymptotic properties. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C92.

Date: 1995
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