EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment

Ying Xue Li and Burkhard Schipper ()

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 121, issue C, 329-367

Abstract: We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (i.e., about the quality of a product) to a receiver. Sequential equilibrium and iterated admissibility predict unraveling of information. Iterated admissibility also provides predictions for every finite level of reasoning about rationality. We observe behavior consistent with relatively high levels of reasoning. Iterated admissibility implies that the level of reasoning required for unraveling is increasing in the number of quality levels. Yet, there is only insignificantly more unraveling in a game with two quality levels than in a game with four quality levels. There is weak evidence for learning. Participants display difficulties in transferring learning from a game with two quality levels to a game with four quality levels. There is a significant but small positive correlation between cognitive abilities in Raven's progressive matrices test and levels of reasoning.

Keywords: Persuasion games; Verifiable information; Communication; Disclosure; Unraveling; Iterated admissibility; Prudent rationalizability; Common strong cautious belief in rationality; Level-k reasoning; Experiments; Cognitive ability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825620300191
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games: An Experiment (2018) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:329-367

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.004

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2022-01-15
Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:121:y:2020:i:c:p:329-367