Preordered service in contract enforcement

Jan U. Auerbach and Miguel Fonseca

Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, vol. 122, issue C, 130-149

Abstract: To address delay and backlog at civil courts, we propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of low-profile cases for breach of contract. Courts preannounce a list that uses uniquely identifying information to rank potential low-profile contracts, like a combination of contracting parties' taxpayer numbers. They use this list to schedule initial hearings of filed low-profile contract cases in that order. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games through unraveling. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce court caseloads.

Keywords: Judicial system; Courts; Judiciary performance; Legal procedure; Civil cases; Caseload; Contract enforcement; Population of investment games; Unraveling; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 K00 K12 K40 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:122:y:2020:i:c:p:130-149

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.04.007

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