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Preordered Service in Contract Enforcement

Jan Auerbach and Miguel Fonseca ()
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Jan Auerbach: Department of Economics, University of Exeter

No 1704, Discussion Papers from University of Exeter, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose a procedural rule that we refer to as preordered service to replace sequential service of civil cases for breach of contract. The judiciary preannounces a list that ranks all entities that may enter contracts by some uniquely identifying information, such as taxpayer numbers. Courts use this list to enforce the contracts of the highest ranked entities that file a contract case. In theory, unlike sequential service, preordered service ensures efficiency in a population of investment games. Results from a laboratory experiment suggest that it may substantially reduce the caseload at courts and mitigate payoff inequality.

Keywords: Judicial system; courts; judiciary performance; legal procedure; civil cases; caseload; contract enforcement; population of investment games; experiments. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K00 K12 K40 O17 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-law
Date: 2017
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