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Geoffroy de Clippel, Victor Naroditskiy, Maria Polukarov, Amy Greenwald and Nicholas R. Jennings

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 392-404

Abstract: We study the problem of allocating m identical items among n>m agents with unit demand and private value for consuming the good. We allow payments and focus on dominant-strategy implementation. In the absence of an auctioneer who can absorb payments collected from the agents, the payments must be burnt to support dominant-strategy implementation.

Keywords: Redistribution mechanisms; Budget balance; Inefficient allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Destroy to Save (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:392-404

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.11.002

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