Imitation and the role of information in overcoming coordination failures

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Simon Weidenholzer

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 87, issue C, 397-411

Abstract: We consider minimum-effort games played in an arbitrary network. For a family of imitation behavioral rules, including Imitate the Best and the Proportional Imitation Rule, we show that inefficient conventions arise independently of the interaction structure, if information is limited to the interaction neighborhoods. In the presence of information spillovers, we provide a condition on the network structure that guarantees the emergence of efficient conventions. In contrast, if this condition is violated we will observe inefficient conventions, even in the presence of information spillovers.

Keywords: Minimum effort games; Local interactions; Learning; Imitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:87:y:2014:i:c:p:397-411

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.013

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