Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment

Jona Linde, Joep Sonnemans () and Jan Tuinstra

Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, vol. 86, issue C, 77-95

Abstract: Minority games are a stylized description of strategic situations with both coordination and competition. These games are widely studied using either simulations or laboratory experiments. Simulations can show the dynamics of aggregate behavior, but the results of such simulations depend on the type of strategies used. So far experiments provided little guidance on the type of strategies people use because the set of possible strategies is very large. We therefore use a multi-round strategy method experiment to directly elicit people's strategies. Between rounds participants can adjust their strategy and test the performance of (possible) new strategies against strategies from the previous round. Strategies gathered in the experiment are subjected to an evolutionary competition. The strategies people use are very heterogeneous although aggregate outcomes resemble the symmetric Nash equilibrium. The strategies that survive evolutionary competition achieve much higher levels of coordination.

Keywords: Minority game; Strategy experiment; Evolution; Simulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C72 C91 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825614000451
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Strategies and Evolution in the Minority Game: A Multi- Round Strategy Experiment (2013)
Working Paper: Strategies and Evolution in the Minority Game: A Multi- Round Strategy Experiment (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:86:y:2014:i:c:p:77-95

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.001

Access Statistics for this article

Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai

More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().